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A Frontier Approach to Testing the Averch-Johnson Hypothesis
Introduction
The proposition that regulated utilities would inefficiently over-invest in capital was first advanced in a seminal paper by Averch and Johnson (1962) . They argued that utility regulation permits the monopoly supplier to earn a rate of return s that exceeds its opportunity cost of capital r, where s is less than the monopoly profit-maximizing return.
The s-r differential acts as a subsidy to capital which induces a (constrained) profit maximizer to increase the amount of capital per unit of output beyond what the true factor prices would indicate. In the language of modern frontier analysis, the regulated utility is technically efficient (operating on its relevant isoquant) but allocatively evidence in support of the A-J hypothesis, but their failure to abstract from technical inefficiency means any observed overuse of capital may just as easily be caused by lack of cost minimizing behavior by the regulated monopoly as from a distorting capital subsidy. Moreover, a credible test of the A-J hypothesis also requires establishing a link between any finding of inefficient overuse of capital and the s-r subsidy.
Employing Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), we find that mean radial technical efficiency of 337 electric generating plants is .845, which illustrates that previous studies which assume full technical efficiency start out by making a fundamental error. After adjusting for technical efficiency by alternately including input slacks as technical or allocative inefficiency, we do find evidence of the overuse of capital hypothesized by Averch-Johnson. However, we are unable to link the observed inefficiency to the difference in the allowed return s and the cost of capital r, leading us to conclude that the evidence does not appear to support the hypothesis. This paper takes as its starting point the celebrated 1970 data set used by Christensen-Greene (C-G) (1976) to estimate returns to scale of 114 firms in the electric generating industry, which itself is an extension of an earlier data set assembled by Marc
Nerlove. This data is contemporaneous with the era during which the A-J hypothesis was first advanced, and is not contaminated by the subsequent oil shocks and related distortions.
The unit of observation is a cross-section of fossil fueled steam-electric generating plants, rather than the utility firms and holding companies studied by Christensen-Greene (1976) .
2 Using plants avoids the tricky issue of capital aggregation pointed out by Cowing and Smith (1978) , and the allocation of joint costs of management or maintenance when the utility firm is engaged in other activities, such as supplying water or natural gas.
Measurement issues and the separable inputs used in the transmission and distribution side of the electric utility industry have caused the existing A-J literature to focus exclusively on the generation of electric power, and we continue that tradition in this paper. 3 Since the Averch-Johnson hypothesis is a description of long-run behavior of the regulated utility, all inputs used to generate electricity are assumed to be variable, and each is assigned an actual or imputed market price.
Data Envelopment Analysis
The literature about testing the Averch-Johnson Hypothesis is dominated by econometric methods that derive testable hypotheses based on first order optimization conditions of cost minimization, profit maximization, etc. Averch-Johnson themselves do not address the possibility that the firm might not be operating on its production frontier.
With the exception of the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) regression model, the econometric approach virtually mandates assuming technical efficiency. Typical is Courville (1974, 56) , who says "…the regulated monopoly will operate on its production frontier; thus the regulated firm will not waste the resources it has acquired." Apart from imposing, rather than testing for technical efficiency, the econometric approach requires assuming and testing a parametric functional form of the underlying technology. In addition, all the issues of simultaneity, collinearity, and heteroscedasticty or serial correlation of the residuals must also be addressed. Zimmer (op. cit.) catalogues these deficiencies in some detail, and also focuses upon the critical shortcomings in the way prior studies have measured the cost of capital.
The nonparametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method for determining a production frontier to measure efficiency, based on mathematical programming, was first introduced by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) . Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) extended DEA to allow for variable returns to scale. In the ensuing years many methodological and conceptual improvements have appeared. As of 2002, more than three thousand DEA-related publications are recorded [Ray (2004) , 1]. Originally intended to deal with situations where price data was lacking and focusing on purely technical efficiency between inputs and outputs, it is nowadays possible to use DEA to estimate neoclassical cost, profit and revenue frontiers using input and output prices. The origin of DEA is reflected in the convention of referring to the units of observation as Decision Making Units (DMUs), rather than firms, in order to allow for government or non-profit organizations. Chief among the strengths of DEA is that it does not require specification of a parametric function to represent the underlying technology. A CobbDouglas, translog, Leontieff and other functional forms are at best a simplified approximation to a complicated process, and they have the potential to yield erroneous results if the approximation is poor. However, the critical limitation of DEA is that it is deterministic, i.e. no account is explicitly taken of measurement error. The absence of an error term probably accounts for the slowness with which its use has spread among economists, who are mostly brought up in the econometric tradition. The programming approach envelops the observed data points and hangs on outlier observations to define the efficient frontier. If these outliers are data errors, the resulting frontier is correspondingly compromised. Against this, DEA uses as its point of reference observed best practice of peer DMUs, which many observers feel is more appropriate than the parametric approach whose reference is the theoretical maximum output, revenue or profit or, minimum cost.
The DEA Model
In order to minimize the cost of output we employ the following input oriented DEA model [Zhu (2003) The maintained hypothesis of Averch-Johnson is that the regulated utility employs more than the least-cost quantity of capital, but that it operates in a technically efficient manner. In order to decompose cost inefficiency into its technical and allocative components we must also determine the efficient production function frontier for the 337 utility plant DMUs. To that end, the following VRS envelopment model is employed:
Model 2 is input-oriented, where the inputs are minimized and the output kept at its observed level. DMU o represents one of the n DMUs under evaluation, and x io and y ro are the ith input and rth output. θ* is the input-oriented efficiency score of DMU o . Since θ = 1 is a feasible solution, the optimal value θ* ≤ 1. If θ* = 1, the current input levels cannot be proportionally reduced while holding output constant, and DMU o is on the production function frontier. If θ* < 1, then DMU o is dominated by the frontier. Since the solution to this model involves only equi-proportionate reduction in all inputs, positive input and output slacks may be present (Zhu, 7) . The following linear programming model is used to determine any non-zero slacks after the DEA envelopment model 2 is solved (ibid).
Input slacks s i
Model 3
Data
The data set starts with a cross-section of 114 Class A and B privately owned electric generating utility firms. 6 The final data set consists of 337 plants, representing 95 of the 114 original firms. In the DEA methodology, total cost is the product of input quantities and the unit prices of each input, rather than the observed expenditures on inputs of the DMU. The latter is typically available only at the level of the firm rather than the plant. During the 1960s the federal corporate income tax rate was over fifty percent, so the weighted average cost of capital incorporates the tax deductibility of debt interest, which reduces the mean cost of capital from about .08 to .06. Thus the A-J cost of capital r is firm-specific, and incorporates the most important investment risks. Christensen-Greene (op. cit.) used the dollar amount of debt interest and the book value of depreciation as their cost of capital. They acknowledge its limitations and actually suggest the approach taken here [Greene (1976) , 128]. Moreover, since C-G were estimating a cost function it was not necessary for them to estimate the stock of capital. Atkinson and Halvorsen (op. cit., 87) used the national average interest rate of AAA utility bonds as their r.
The ideal measure of the 'price' of capital is the imputed rental price or user cost of capital, which incorporates the foregone rate of return r and the depreciation or 'using up' of capital, plus any capital gains or losses on the capital asset. In order to estimate economic depreciation, the useful life of the asset is needed. It is common in capital stock estimation to assume a uniform life and time profile of depreciation, e.g., straight-line, declining balance, etc. [Atkinson and Halvorsen (1980) and Ulmer (1960) ]. That is not entirely satisfactory in the present situation because the economic life of an asset is clearly a choice variable of interest when assessing the A-J hypothesis, not a technological constant. The method used here treats the levelized annuity factor that would permit recovery of the replacement cost as an annual mortgage payment as the 'price of capital', with the annuity interest rate set equal to the weighted cost of capital r and the annuity life equal to the predicted economic life of the generating plant equipment. The same method is used for structure capital, except that we are forced to assume a uniform life of 45 years because of the absence of relevant information about structure retirements. The life of structure capital is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (1999). The virtue of this annuity factor method is that the user cost is the same over the life of the asset, and it is not very sensitive to variations in the predicted life span.
In order to estimate the economic life of generating plants, data on the fifty-five retirements of steam electric plants that occurred during the 1960's is used to fit a parametric (Weibull) regression survivor function (available from the authors). The fitted life of the generating equipment is a function of (real) fuel prices, interest rates, wage costs and the effective federal corporate tax rate [Kiefer (1980) 
DEA Results
The basic VRS cost minimizing Model 1 yields a mean cost efficiency score of .78. Therefore, these 337 steam-electric plants could lower production costs by an average of twenty-two percent if they eliminated existing overuse of all inputs and noncost minimizing input proportions.
Turning to the separation of technical from allocative efficiency, the VRS production frontier of Model 2 shows a mean radial technical efficiency score of .843.
Thus all inputs could be proportionally reduced by about fifteen percent, while holding electricity output constant at the observed level. 11 Model 3 then optimizes the slacks remaining after the maximum proportional reduction of all inputs (also holding output constant), and results in target technically efficient amounts of each input quantity which are less than or equal to the radially reduced amounts. Disagreement exists as to whether input slacks should be regarded as a form of technical or allocative inefficiency. The A-J model is based on the smoothly convex isoquants of neoclassical microeconomics, in which there are no slacks--which are due to the piecewise linear nature of DEA
isoquants. In what follows next we allocate the input slacks to technical inefficiency, on the grounds that this is most consistent with the original A-J framework. This constitutes the most stringent test of the A-J hypothesis because the smallest amount of measured economic inefficiency is attributed to incorrect input proportions. We also consider the alternate specification which treats the slacks as a form of allocative inefficiency.
Since the maintained A-J hypothesis involves input proportions, it is necessary to focus on the technically efficient input ratios relative to the least-cost ratios. Let (K/F) represent the technically efficient ratio of generating capital (K) to fuel input (F), based on the slack optimized target inputs (slacks treated as technical inefficiency). Denote the cost minimizing ratio of generating capital to fuel as (K*/F*). If the (K/F) / (K*/F*) ratio equals unity, there is no allocative inefficiency in the sense proposed by A-J: the technically efficient input ratio is also allocatively efficient. If this ratio exceeds unity, then capital is overused because the firm is not operating where the piecewise linear corner of the isoquant is tangent to the isocost line defined by unsubsidized input prices.
A similar approach applies to structure capital (S) and labor (L).
Figure 1
The isoquant-isocost diagram of Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual framework herein employed, using the example of generating capital K and fuel input F. Averch- Johnson maintains that the capital subsidy s-r distorts the input price ratio from that represented by isocost line EE' to RR', resulting in overuse of capital at point C, instead of the technically and allocatively efficient point A. The ratio of factor proportions (K/F) / (K*/F*) thus measures the extent of the A-J induced allocative inefficiency.
Suppose that the firm is observed producing output Q o using the amounts of K and F indicated by point D. Its radial technical efficiency is the ratio OC/OD < 1, and its radial allocative efficiency is OB/OC < 1. Point B lies on the same least cost isocost line EE'. This firm's overall cost efficiency CE = OB/OD. 12 The DEA production frontier projects point D back onto the isoquant at C, and the cost minimization program identifies point B. [Greene (1976) , 15]). Slacks are treated as technical inefficiency in Table 2 . The DEA evidence in Table 2 does appear to support the A-J hypothesis, although not in precisely the manner they suggested. Overuse of capital is most pronounced in the case of generating equipment (K) relative to fuel (F), in which case ninety percent of plants employ more than the cost minimizing ratio of these two inputs. If only the A-J effect was operative we would expect no distortion in the use of fuel and labor, but Table 2 shows that these inputs are also not used in a cost minimizing manner.
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Turning next to the case where slacks are treated as a type of allocative inefficiency, we use the following relationship: AE = CE/TE, where AE is the proportionate or radial measure of allocative efficiency, CE is radial cost efficiency and TE is the proportionate measure of technical efficiency [See Coelli, et. al. (2005) , 184].
In the present instance AE = .78/.843 = .925. From this perspective, the electric utility industry is quite efficient in adjusting input proportions to relative factor prices. In addition to these radial measures of efficiency, we compute the analog to the allocative efficiency ratios of Table 2, except that now the input slacks are assumed to be a form of allocative inefficiency. The mean inefficiency ratios of generating capital and structure capital to fuel inputs are 2.89 and 4.66, respectively. Contrast these numbers with the 1.20 and 1.11 ratios of Table 2 where slacks are treated as part of technical inefficiency.
Implicit in the A-J hypothesis is the assumption that the only reason a utility firm is allocatively inefficient in its use of capital is the regulatory-based capital subsidy s-r.
Today we understand that a variety of forces could be at work, and the following section of the paper seeks to more directly link the observed inefficiency to the Averch-Johnson hypothesis.
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Second-Stage Regression Analysis
In this section of the paper we regress the various input ratios and efficiency scores against regulatory and environmental variables in order to determine if the apparent overuse of capital is significantly linked to the A-J subsidy effect. Although fourteen Tobit regressions are estimated, we only report four of them in Table 3 in order to conserve space (the others are available from the authors). The basic conclusion is the same in each instance: there is no statistically significant relationship between the overuse of capital, regardless of how measured, and the s-r capital subsidy.
All of the estimated regressions use the same two sets of explanatory variables as shown in Table 3 . The dependent variables are the inefficiency ratios relating to generating capital and fuel because that is the most important type of capital. Equations (1) and (3) treat slacks as technical inefficiency, whereas equations (2) and (4) count them as allocative inefficiency. The first two equations in Table 3 employ as regressors only the capital subsidy s-r plus two indicator variables to represent the 1960s state-level regulatory environment which use rate base definitions that vary from that used by the FPC. About twenty states defined the rate base according to the Supreme Court's 'fair value' standard (Phillips, op. cit., 220) . A number of other states, including New York and California, adhered to the original cost doctrine in defining the base upon which the utility is permitted to earn a return. The remaining states used various other definitions, such as reproduction cost or 'prudent investment' to define the rate base (Phillips, op. cit., (272) (273) (274) . These 'other' states are the default category for the two indicator variables.
Coefficients and other statistics that are statistically significant (95% or better) are shown in bold type. T-ratios are shown in parentheses. In neither equation (1) or (2) is a higher return on capital positively linked to overuse of capital, which is the basic A-J hypothesis.
Equations (3) and (4) in Table 3 the same variable has a negative and insignificant coefficient.
In a regression using structure capital and fuel input ratios (not presented), the coefficient on the capital subsidy variable is significant but negative. This case treats slacks as part of technical inefficiency. In addition, we also regressed the three radial efficiency scores (cost, allocative and technical) against the same explanatory variables used in Table 3 . There is some evidence (90 % level of significance) that the larger the capital subsidy s-r, the higher are the efficiency scores. This is what might be expected, but is evidence against the A-J hypothesis which argues that the larger the subsidy the less efficient is the firm. 
Conclusion
It is more than forty years since Averch and Johnson advanced their intriguing and controversial hypothesis that utility regulation intended to curb the inefficiency arising from monopoly could inadvertently result in an offsetting inefficiency in the form of excessive use of capital. Five of the six most cited studies of the A-J effect summarized by Zimmer (1978) find evidence in support of it, as do Atkinson and Halvorsen (1980) . Given that we also find significant evidence of overcapitalization, it is understandable that these other authors found in favor of the A-J hypothesis. But they erred by assuming that the only cause of economic inefficiency could be the A-J effect. Once technical inefficiency is netted out, and a direct link to the return on the utility's rate base relative to its cost of capital is tested for, we find little evidence to support the A-J hypothesis. Courville (ibid. 59) argues that distribution and transmission are probably characterized by fixed input proportions. He further maintains that transmission systems are initially overbuilt to allow for growth or power pooling, making inefficient overinvestment hard to detect, and that electricity distribution has been characterized by confounding changes in technology absent on the generating side. 4 Following Christensen-Greene, all fossil fuel inputs are converted to BTU equivalents and priced per BTU. This implicitly assumes the firm has selected the cost-minimizing mix of fuels. 5 Two separate cost frontiers based on Conventional (Indoor) boiler plants versus Outdoor and Semi Outdoor plants were estimated. The Wilcoxon nonparametric test of the hypothesis that the separate efficiency scores are drawn from the same parent distribution is not rejected, with a t-ratio of -1.64. Thus we proceed by assuming the underlying technology is the same across the data set. 6 Class A and B utilities have annual net revenues in excess of $2.5 million. 7 In principle, one could construct plant level costs by multiplying actual or imputed factor prices by observed inputs quantities, and then employ a technique such as Stochastic Frontier Analysis. 8 The mean proportion of each element of capital is as follows: common stock equity (.35), preferred stock (.086), long term (30 year) debt (.514) and notes (.045). The tax deductibility of debt interest is not explicitly considered, but this should not make much difference because cross-section (federal) tax rates should be the same and the capital structure is fairly similar across firms. 9 The Value Line stock betas cover a period of at least two years. 10 The mean service life of retired plants is 29.4 years, and the predicted mean life is 19.4 years. This difference may be due to the corporate tax changes introduced in the 1960's that were favorable to the capital-intensive utility industry. 11 229 plants are found to operate in the region of the production frontier where there is increasing returns to scale, 6 in the region of constant returns to scale and only 2 where there is decreasing returns. 12 Note that OB/OC = (OB/OD) / (OC/OD). 13 It is worth noting that fuel is systematically underused relative to capital and labor. Since its market price in 1970 was likely less than the social cost because of pollution relating to coal fired plants, it is possible that any distorting capital subsidy due to the A-J effect causes less social inefficiency than otherwise might occur. 14 Electricity generated by fossil fuels, especially coal which is the dominant fuel source, generates significant external social costs in the form of air pollution. Significant carbon taxes on use of fossil fuels have been proposed in order to internalize these external costs. That the regulatory capital subsidy causes overuse of capital and under use of fuel might be viewed as a Second Best resource allocation issue. 15 All the regressions are estimated using the Tobit model, owing to the limited range of the alternate dependent variables. 16 The number of observations is less than the full 337 because of missing data. 17 The regions are the same as used in the Handy-Whitman Index to adjust the construction cost of capital.
